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1. A similar situation ?
 At the beginning of the century, Germany and France face similar economic 
and social choices. 
 Their economic and social structures are typical of the European social 
model in its continental version. This model is characterized by a high level 
of public spending and social transfers, important redistributions, important 
intervention of the State in the economy, close relationships between firms, 
banks and the State, an important role of trade unions both at the enterprise 
and at national level, a strong employment protection. 
 This model is challenged by liberalism, by globalization and by European 
construction. 
 The two countries must choose between defending their model or transform 
it in depth. The leading classes have chosen the strategy of transformation.
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This strategy raises three issues : 
1. Toward  what model should European countries evolve? Are they 
obliged to move towards the liberal model? Could they try to maintain 
a specific system, compatible with the European Social Model? Is the 
Scandinavian model an alternative?  The question arises regarding 
the labour market,  industrial policy, financial structures, taxation or 
social policies.
2. This transition has social and economic costs which add to 
globalization costs.
3. The leading classes have to find allies and to overcome social classes 
opposed to change. They must cut social benefits, make jobs and 
wages flexible, increase social inequalities…They must destroy the 
old alliance - public and private sectors workers, welfare state 
recipients - to build a new alliance - entrepreneurs and workers of 
well-performing firms, new  leading classes (financial sectors, 
medias), wealthy people. Social cohesion will be weakened.
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 The year 1980 saw the ‘renaissance’ of  liberal project at world scale. The 
Anglo-Saxon countries break with the Keynesian project (maintain full 
employment in an increasingly socialized society) to find again a renewed 
triumphant capitalism: to restore companies’ profits, to develop financial 
markets, to accept widening inequalities, to make markets flexible, to lower 
public expenses and taxes.
 This model is spread by trade and financial globalisation and by European 
construction. It comes in conflict with the traditional governance of continental 
European Countries, which must accept to reform themselves, but these 
reforms lead to resistance, with varying importance depending on the 
country.
 Since 1980, continental countries have to undertake economic and social 
reforms. These are years of sluggish growth and mass unemployment, whose 
responsibility is hard to define. Is it to undertake liberal reforms ? Is it to 
undertake these reforms with not enough force? Is this the inevitable cost of 
transition?
 European institutions paralyse part of tools of States and at the same time it 
imposes the direction. Bigger countries have more difficulty that smaller ones 
to reform: the cost is greater, social consensus is more difficult to obtain, they 
can more easily resist the European pressures.
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Germany and France, however, significant disparities: 
1. Reunification whose economic weight was heavy for Germany.
2. The strength of its industrial sector allowed Germany to restore its situation 
recently. 
3. France has more difficulty to adapt to European institutions, the ECB and 
the SGP, less in its tradition
4. The difference in the position and the strength of political parties and trade 
unions. France was involved in specific policies (nationalisation, 35 hour 
working week) and did not introduce liberal reforms before 2007 while these 
reforms met less resistance in Germany.
In 2008, France appears to have resisted more to the liberal wave, when 
Germany followed a strategy of labour market reforms and wage restraint. 
In these two countries, the issues are similar: should people have to accept 
the liberal model and try to implement it as soon as possible? Would it be 
possible to  maintain a specific model of society? Is a  new compromise 
possible? Is the liberal model a solution with its inequalities and its 
instabilities ?
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2. Growth performances
 The countries recording the best growth performances vary over time. 
Since 1998, the best performers are the liberal countries, some 
Mediterranean countries (Spain and Greece) and the Scandinavian 
countries. The losers are the 3 major countries of the euro zone and 
Portugal. Should we extend the results of the last 10 years to infer that the 
major continental countries or the Continental model countries are 
condemned to a slow growth?
 Each of these 3 countries have their specificities. Germany has 
experienced five years of very low growth (2001-2005), in a classic 
pressure on wages and weak domestic demand. German GDP growth 
rebounds in 2006-2007 with a huge external surplus and a public balance 
in equilibrium. 
 On the contrary, Italy and France keep low growth, together with important 
public and external deficits for France, external deficit for Italy. Is the  
German strategy a model for France or Italy? Or has this strategy 
contributed to push the euro area economies into stagnation? 
Germany, France, two answers ?
8
Table 1. Economic performance
Real GDP growth 
(percent p.a.) 1960/1973 1973/1980 1980/1990 1990/1998 1998/2007 1960/2007
EU-15 4.7 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.9
Euro Area 5,1 2,6 2,4 1.9 2.2 3,1
Continental Model 4.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.9
Germany 4.3 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.5 2.6
France 5.4 2.6 2.4 1.7 2.0 3.1
Belgium 4.9 2.7 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.9
Netherlands 4.9 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.3 3.2
Austria 4.9 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 3.1
Mediterranean Model 6.2 3.7 2.5 1.8 2.4 3.6
Greece 8.5 3.0 0.7 2.0 4.3 4.1
Italy 5.3 3.6 2.4 1.3 1.4 3.0
Portugal 6.9 4.0 3.3 2.7 1.7 4.0
Spain 7.2 3.8 2.9 2.3 3.7 4.3
Scandinavian Model 4.4 2.0 2.4 1.9 3.0 2.9
Denmark 4.4 1.7 2.1 3.0 2.4 2.9
Finland 5.0 2.8 3.0 1.5 3.4 3.3
Sweden 4.1 1.8 2.2 1.4 3.1 2.8
Liberal Model 4.2 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.2
Ireland 4.4 4.7 3.6 6.7 6.3 5.0
United Kingdom 3.2 1.0 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.5
United States 4.4 2.6 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.3
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 Since 1980, French economic policy has oscillated between the Keynesian 
strategy and  a  neo-classical consolidation strategy.
 In 1981-83, the Keynesian expansionary policy launched by the left 
government fails. The increases in wages and taxes caused a decline in 
company profits and high inflation, which induced a strong external deficit 
obliging to devalue the French francs, thereby increasing inflation further. 
France has met a supply barrier.
 In 1983, the government had no choice but run a new strategy : ‘rigour’ and 
competitive disinflation. Fiscal and wage restraints reduced growth, 
increased unemployment but allowed for the restoration of profits and a 
strong disinflation. Growth resumed robustly from 1987 to 1989.
 In 1990, the German reunification has resulted in a sharp rise in interest 
rates which together with the world recession caused a sharp deceleration 
of growth. The Maastricht criteria imposed a restrictive fiscal policy. The 
slow growth persisted until 1996, in a situation of low inflation and external 
surplus. It is the lack of demand which slowed growth. France was 
paralyzed by an inadequate economic policy imposed by European 
construction. 
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 In 1997-2000, France has experienced a revival of growth allowed by the 
restoration of profits, the low level of the euro and an original economic 
policy (35 hour working week, reduction in employers’ contributions). 
 In 2001, France was hit by the world recession induced by the stock 
market crisis of September 11. In the absence of expansionary policy, 
growth did not resume. The French economy suffered from the German 
restrictive policy and the U.S. exchange rate. France had no inflation; the 
firm margins  remained high, but the external deficit widened. France 
suffered from a lack of domestic and external demands.
 Over the period, the French economic policy failed to maintain a
satisfactory growth, structural reforms were shy and did not succeed… 
Growth depended on miracles that were not present except in 87-89 and 
97-00.
 Since 1983, slowing down of growth were not caused by supply  
constraints, but by internal or mainly external demand shocks, that 
economic policy were not able to offset 
Germany, France, two answers ?
11
The EMU experience
 France and Germany have witnessed a sharp slowdown in growth in the 
years 1990. Despite a  growth revival in 1997-2000 for France, EMU has 
not translated for them by the expected acceleration of growth. Like the 
whole area, both countries suffered from the Internet crisis, the rise of the 
euro and the weakness of  European economic policy. 
 From 1999 to 2005, euro area growth is only at 1.45%, while France is 
slightly higher, at1.65%, but Germany is only at 0.6%. In 2006-2007, the  
German growth is 2.7%, as  in the euro zone and well above France, 2%. 
 In terms of GDP per capita, their situation is deteriorating since 1991, both 
vis-à-vis the UE15, the United Kingdom or the US.
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Table 2. GDP per head of population in PPS
Euro area =100
France Germany United Kingdom United States
1991 102.0 112.6 92.8 132.6
1998 99.9 106.3 100.6 139.2
2007 98.1 102.3 105.8 138.6
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 Since 10 years, growth in domestic demand is much stronger in France 
than in Germany, but the gap has widened further since 2001. 
 This comes especially from household expenditures. France has seen 
robust growth of household spending while Germany saw its consumption  
grow slowly and housing investment decline, reflecting both  low growth of  
households income and stagnation of its population (against an increase of 
0.8% per annum in France).
 On the other hand, foreign trade has greatly reduced French growth (0.5 
points per year) while it supported German growth. This discrepancy has 3 
causes which are difficult to distinguish: price-competitiveness, robustness 
of domestic demand, strength of the industrial sector.
 Since 8 years, Germany and France have chosen different strategies, 
France continues to support its growth through domestic demand, Germany 
has chosen a strategy of competitiveness. 
 From 1995 to 2005, the French strategy was successful, but these last two 
years show a reversal.
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Figure 1. FRANCE: Contribution to GDP growth
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Figure 2. GERMANY: Contribution to GDP growth
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Table 3. Average annual growth 1999/2007
* Contribution
France Germany Euro Area
GDP 2.1 1.5 2.1
Private consumption 2.5 0.6 1.7
Public consumption 1.6 0.7 1.9
Productive investment 3.9 2.8 3.3
Residential Investment 3.2 -1.6 3.3
Exports 3.9 8.1 7.2
Imports 5.6 5.8 7.5
Domestic demand 2.5 0.6 1.9
Foreign balance* -0.5 1.1 0.0
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3. Difference in the required growth ?
 From 1993 to 2006, the working age population has continued to grow in 
France (+6.3%), but begun to fall in Germany. Activity rates increase more 
rapidly in Germany but the growth of German potential population has 
remained below the French one (0.4% by year against 0.8% for France).
 In 2006, the employment rate in full-time equivalent is 58% in France, 60% 
in Germany against 64% in the United Kingdom, 67.5% in the USA, 69.5% 
in Sweden. France and Germany have a margin of increase of about 10%
before to face a  labour supply constraint. In both countries, this implies an 
increase of female participation (and more full-time in Germany) and an 
important increase in older workers employment (which has already started 
in Germany, but not in France).
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Table 4. Unemployment variation  1993/ 2006
In %
United 
Kingdom France Germany Italy
Unemployment variation -5.0 -2.0 2.5 -3.2
Population 15/64 
contribution 7.6 6.3 -1.0 -0.2
Activity rate contribution 0.8 4.4 6.1 7.4
Employment contribution -14.5 -12.2 -2.2 -11.1 
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Table 5. Activity rates in 2006
France Germany Sweden United-Kingdom
Males
Activity rate 25-55 93.8 93.8 92.5 91.7
Activity rate 55-65 46.8 64.1 76.2 68.3
Part time rate 5.1 7.6 8.4 9.9
Females
Activity rate 25-55 81.2 80.3 86.2 79.9
Activity rate 55-65 40.5 46.7 69.8 50.2
Part time rate 22.5 39.2 19.0 38.8
Unemployment rate 8.3 8.4 6.1 5.2
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 Until 2020, the working age population would remain stable in France, while it 
would decrease at the rate of 0.4% per annum in Germany.
 In Germany, the rate of activity is likely continue to increase, particularly for 
55-65, at a rate of 0.4% per annum. To obtain an unemployment rate of 5% in 
2020 against 8.4% in 2007, Germany needs an employment growth of around 
0.4% per annum. 
 France lags behind Germany as regards older workers’ activity rates. To 
succeed its pension reform, it would have to achieve an increase of its activity 
rate of 0.6% per annum. To obtain an unemployment rate of 5% in 2020 
(against 8.3% in 2007), France needs a employment growth of 1% per 
annum. So there is a differential of 0.6% between the growth rate required in 
France and in Germany. 
 From 1997 to 2007, the unemployment rate has sharply declined in the euro 
area (3.2 points), but Germany remains the worst performer (- 0.9 points), 
while France is in the average (3, 2 points).
 Employment grew by 1.4% per annum in the euro area, against 1.25% in the 
USA. In France, employment growth was 1.1% by year against 0.6 % In 
Germany. 
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 France and Germany have seen the growth of labour productivity eroded 
from 1973 to 1990, although the performance of France have always been 
better. Since 1990, France takes behind the USA and Germany.
 The period 1999-2005 saw the gap between productivity of the US and 
Europe widened, because of a better integration of ICT and of 
discrepancies between the labour market situations. In under-employment 
context, public policy incentive firms to maintain employment. Both 
countries have sought to increase employment by gains in competitiveness 
in industry, Germany has been a little more successful than France (3.8% 
against 3.2%).
 France has chosen to encourage non-industrial firms to reduce gains in 
labour productivity gains and to hire unskilled workers. This strategy was 
successful in terms of employment in the short term, even if it reduce the 
growth potential growth. 
 From 2001 to 2007, France has experienced an employment growth of 
0.7% by year against 0.2% for Germany. But the situation was reversed in 
2007 (1.2% in France, 1.7% in Germany).
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Table 6. Labour productivity growth
61-73 74-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-07
France 4.7 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 0.9
Germany 4.2 2.1 1.3 2.8 2.2 1.5
United States 2.4 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.1 1.7
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Table 7. Labour cost 2000-2007
France Germany
All economy
Wage 3.0 1.1
Productivity 0.9 1.3
Unit labour cost 1.9 -0.2
Industry
Wage 2.7 2.2
Productivity 3.2 3.8
Unit labour cost -0.6 -1.5
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 During the 1997-2007 period, 8 countries in the area remained in mass 
unemployment. As they represent 90% of the area, it is hard to understand 
why they have not tried to undertake more dynamic policies as inflation was 
very low and the current account in surplus In fact, the leading classes of 
these countries consider that the priority is not to support growth and 
achieve full employment, but rather to implement structural reforms. 
 One explanation for this passivity could be the need to fight against inflation. 
But, in both countries studied, inflation was extremely low since 1987, even 
if an increase was registered in Germany in 1990-93, during reunification. 
Over the period 1999-2007, inflation was only 1.3% in Germany and 1.5% in 
France. In the euro zone, countries with high inflation are catching up and 
rapid growth countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain) and not countries with slow 
growth and high public deficit.
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About the Nairu
 Another explanation could be the constraint that would impose a high level 
of equilibrium unemployment rate (NAIRU). If  the unemployment rate goes 
below this limit, economic policy could be forced to become restrictive. 
Unfortunately, estimates of NAIRU are extremely variable and not reliable 
for European countries. 
 For example, OECD considers that NAIRU is 8.7% for France in 2003 
(when the unemployment rate to 8.5%) and 7.8% in 2007 (when the 
unemployment rate is 8%). The NAIRU therefore fall as the  effective 
unemployment rate and France was during this period above the EUR, 
which is not credible. 
 From 2001 to 2007, the real wage growth in Germany was 0.5% per year 
(using the GDP deflator) or 0.1% (using the consumer price). It was 0.9% or 
1.25% in France. In the two countries, we did not see excessive wage 
increases due to too high tensions on the labour market. 
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3. Two strategies?
 In the 1999-2007 period, the wages shares in GDP decreased in the euro 
area as a whole. The decrease was particularly strong in Austria, Spain, 
Germany, on the contrary, France and Italy have not experienced such 
reductions. The wages share stands in 2007 below the 1970 level by 7 
points in France and the euro zone, Germany 6 points, 4 points in the USA. 
This transfer, which has benefited dividends, is the price to pay for ensuring 
a satisfactory return to shareholders.
 Increasing company profitability and price competitiveness through 
downwards pressure on wages became a major strategy in several 
countries, like in Germany and Austria. 
 It was the only instrument of economic policy remain to countries who could 
not or depreciate their exchange rate or lower their interest rates or employ 
fiscal policy. 
 Firms were able to  threaten to relocate their production abroad, particularly 
in the NMS if wages were not reduced.
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Table 8 . Adjusted wage share in GDP, 1998/2007
Source: European Commission.
Change in percentage point, 1998-2007
Euro area -2.0
Belgium -2.4
Germany -3.0
Greece -1.5
Spain -5.5
France - 0.2
Ireland 0.4
Italy -0.2
Netherlands 1.5
Austria -6.9
Portugal 1.2
Finland - 0.9
Denmark -0.3
Sweden -0.6
UK 0.6
US -1.2
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 This strategy of low wage growth has been accepted by salaries in 
Germany but not in France, where unions do not believe in the trade-off 
between wage and employment. 
 This strategy boosted exports but put a drag on private consumption in 
these countries, thus dampening demand in the whole euro area.
 Other countries had the choice between two painful strategies : 
1. To follow the German example which will induce a costly race to the bottom.
2. Not to follow and to suffer from an unsustainable external deficit
Germany, France, two answers ?
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Wage competition: A non-cooperative game
¾ Winners: Germany which succeeded to support domestic GDP growth by a 
positive contribution of net exports (by around 0.9 percentage point of GDP 
each year). 
¾ Losers: Spain and France (both 0.7 percentage point per year). 
 Considering patterns of domestic and foreign demand, euro area countries 
can be divided into 4 groups: 
¾ ‘Winners’: Ireland, Spain, Greece - with both strong domestic and foreign 
demand 
¾ ‘Bad guys’: Germany, Austria, Netherlands - offsetting weak domestic demand 
by strong gains in export demand
¾ ‘Losers’: Italy, Portugal - suffering from both low domestic and external demand
¾ ‘victims’: France, Belgium, Finland - where a weak external demand partly 
offsets a satisfactory domestic demand.  
Germany, France, two answers ?
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French households in a better situation…
 The slowdown in the German households disposable income compared to 
the previous decade contrasts with its acceleration in France. The 
contribution of wages and social benefits has been lower in Germany, 
where property and independent income have contributed more to 
disposable income growth,
 From 2000 to 2007, the real income of French households increased by 
2.4% in France (more than the GDP, 2%) against 0.5% in Germany (less 
than GDP, 1.5%). Household consumption grew by 2.35% by year in 
France, 0.4% in Germany.  Housing investment increased by 3.2% by year 
in France against a decline of 1.6% by year in Germany. 
 France and Germany are characterized by relatively high household 
savings rate with little decrease in the recent years. German households 
have not offset the decline in the progression of their real income by a fall in 
their savings rate. On the contrary, rising uncertainty linked to reforms led 
them to save more. On the contrary, the household savings rate has fallen 
sharply in the UK and the USA, thus contributing to strongly support the 
activity.
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Figure 3: Contributions to growth of the gross disposable income
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Figure 4. Households savings rate
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Table 9. Households saving rate
1995 2007
France 12,8 13,1
Germany 11,0 11,1
United Kingdom (brut) 10,2 3,3
United States 4,6 0,7
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Two paradoxes…
 It is paradoxical that countries with the pay-as-you-go pension system are 
higher saving rates than countries with capitalisation pensions system, but 
capitalisation systems go with a strong development of financial markets, 
which allows an high level of household debt, which induces a low saving 
rate.
 Output growth is strong in Greece, Spain, the UK and in the US too, while 
both national and households saving rates are very low. On the contrary, 
Belgium, Germany, Austria and France suffer from too high saving rates. 
Low saving rates seem necessary to have high GDP growth and low public 
debt. Virtue is dangerous in Europe, since the weakness of domestic 
demand resulting from a high savings ratio cannot be offset by low interest 
rates or substantial government deficits.
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Table 10. Households wealth (in annual disposable income)
Germany France United Kingdom United States
1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
Non financial 
assets 3.7 3.9 3.1 5.5 2.8 5.0 2.1 2.8
Financial assets 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.9 3.9 4.4 4.0 4.3
Liabilities 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.3
Net wealth 5.0 5.8 4.6 7.5 5.7 7.9 5.1 5.7
Germany, France, two answers ?
36
German Firms did not invest their high profit…
 After increasing their rate of return on capital and their profitability in the 
second half of the nineties, the French and German firms have been 
affected by a fall in their mark-up in the first three years of the Monetary 
Union, in part due to the fall in Euro exchange rate. 
 Since then, the improvement in the economic situation of German firms has 
been spectacular: a sharp increase in the mark-up and in the return on 
capital allowing for an improvement in profitability in spite of a monetary 
retrenchment. In France return on capital has deteriorated negatively 
affecting profitability. 
 The increase in the return rate of German firms since 2001 contrasts with its 
uninterrupted fall in France. In spite of a more rapidly increase in the net 
outflows of dividends, the rapid decrease in the debt ratio of German firms 
has allowed for a fall in the interest paid.  Interest payments were already 
much lower for German firms as the fall in the debt ratio was twice more 
important. The debt ratio was however 50% higher in the mid-nineties.
Germany, France, two answers ?
37
German Firms did not invest their high profit…
 After the tax reform, which induce an acceleration of investment, German 
firms have massively reduced their investment rate in 2001. Since 2001, the 
investment rate of French firms is higher, which is surprising historically. 
High profit does not induce a strong investment when the growth is low.
 The combination of a higher savings rate and of a falling investment rate 
has generated a net lending for German firms since 2002. Strong profits 
had not yet induced a strong investment rate. Savings of French firms have 
been insufficient to finance the improvement in the investment rate, thus 
increasing net borrowing, notably since 2005. 
Germany, France, two answers ?
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Figure 5. Mark-up for non-financial entreprises
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Figure 6. Business sector return on capital
(Gross operating surplus/capital stock)
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Figure 7. Investment rate
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 In France, the deterioration of the company situation, the public deficit and 
the decline of households financial saving rate result in an increase in the 
external deficit. 
 In Germany, by contrast, firms have improved their situation, households 
have increased their financial saving rate inducing a strong external surplus.
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Table 11. Financing Capacity
France Germany
2000 2007 2000 2006
Enterprises -2.0 -4.1 -4.1 0.0
Financial sector 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8
Households 4.3 3.5 3.7 6.0
Administrations -1.5 -2.6 -1.2 -1.6
External 
balance 1.2 -2.8 -1.3 5.2
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External balances : return to old habits
 The euro area as a whole won competitiveness from 1996 to 2001 thanks to 
the fall in the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar. A weak euro together with the 
NTIC bubble induced strong GDP growth (3% per year from 1997 to 2000) 
and employment (8.7% in five years). The competitiveness gains were more 
than cancelled by appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar and Asian 
currencies from 2002 to 2007.
 The euro area needs a weaker exchange rate in the light of the high level of 
unemployment. The euro area has been able to have a low exchange rate 
only when domestic demand was strong in the US, because the US then 
also had an interest in a high dollar. But the euro is high vis-à-vis the dollar 
is always high when US domestic demand is relatively weak. The euro area 
suffers from a less active monetary policy than in the US. Last, the euro 
area suffers from exchange rate policies in Asian countries, where 
exchange rates are kept low to support a fragile GDP growth (Japan), to 
support exports growth (China, new industrial economies) and to 
accumulate foreign currencies reserves. 
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External balances : return to old habits
 The French competitiveness improved significantly from 1981 to 1988 
(competitive disinflation), then from 1995 to 2001 (fall of the euro). It then 
deteriorates (rise of euro, German strategy).
 The German competitiveness deteriorates until 1995, then improved due to 
the fall of Euro. From 2002, the wage restraints compensate the rise of Euro 
and the improvement continues.
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Table 12. Competitive positions (relative unit labour costs)
1981 1988 1995 2001 2007
France 108 102 100 89 96
Germany 69 85 100 84 80
United States 138 112 100 119 85
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External balances : return to old habits
 France has had important external deficits until 1991. France  had surpluses 
from 1993 to 2003. The return to external deficits came in 2004, with the 
euro over-evaluation  and the high energy prices. France is likely to 
implement a restrictive policy to reduce them while they are normal 
considering the international context. 
 Germany has experienced external deficits from 1991 to 2000, which is not 
its habit. Since 2004, Germany has large surpluses (5 points of GDP). 
These surplus compensate for the high households saving rate, the 
equilibrium of public balance and the low level of firms new indebtness (high 
profit, low investment)
 These surpluses finance excessive deficit South countries (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal) as desirable deficits of NMS. But they also have a depressing 
impact on all partners of Germany. 
 The international role of the euro makes it necessary that the euro zone has 
a external deficit. Its distribution among member countries should be 
coordinated in Europe.
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About monetary policy
 From 1960 to 1980, strong growth and high inflation of France had helped 
to maintain real interest rate adjusted for growth relatively low, relatively to 
Germany or the USA. 
 Since 1980, France, virtuous in terms of inflation, was obliged to maintain 
relatively high rates, as markets fear a devaluation against the mark. The 
high level of interest rate increased public debt and obliged firms to increase 
their profit, which has been considered as one main causes of the slow 
growth. 
 After 1996, France found again relatively low rates, while Germany suffers 
from low growth. At the end of the period, the long-term rates are again low 
relatively to growth rates. The period of high interest rates, launched by the 
USA in 1980, has lasted 20 years for France and the USA, 25 years for 
Germany.
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Table 13. Long term interest rate less GDP growth rate
61-73 74-79 80-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-05 06-07
France -4.2 -3.7 2.5 2.5 4.8 1.5 1.0 -0.2
Germany -1.4 0.9 3.6 1.1 1.9 3.0 2.5 0.1
United States -2.7 -2.0 2.7 1.6 2.0 2.0 -0.4 -0.8
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About policy mix
 In a heterogeneous monetary union like the euro zone, catching-up 
countries have structurally higher growth rates and inflation rates higher the 
mature countries, and a single monetary policy is problematic. Countries 
with low growth and low inflation as Germany may suffer from too high 
interest rates. 
 Since 2001, monetary policy was clearly more expansionary as suggested 
by a Taylor rule in the USA; more expansionary also in the euro area, but to 
a lesser degree. During the period 1999-2007, the ECB’ interest rate was 
3% on average, while a Taylor rule, based on an inflation target of 2% and 
on output gaps estimated by the OECD, would have given averages of 
3.2% for Germany and France, 3.9% for the area. The policy of the ECB 
has therefore not too much suffering Germany. 
 However, the inflation target of 2% may be considered too low: the euro 
zone needs a growth recovery which could be accompanied by some 
temporary tensions in some markets. The estimates of the output gap by 
OECD are very conservative: The OECD estimated that the output gap in 
the euro area was zero in 1999 (for an unemployment rate of 9.2%) or 2002 
(for an unemployment rate of 8.3%).
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Table 14. Interest rate: Taylor rule and  actual CB objective rate
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Euro Area
Taylor rule 
EA 2.55 4.95 5.3 4.45 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.7 3.95
Taylor rule F 1.5 4.15 3.95 3.55 3.55 3.75 2.9 3.05 2.6
Taylor rule G 1.7 4.0 4.75 3.2 1.8 2.7 2.65 3.25 4.5
Actual rate 2.7 4.05 4.3 3.2 2.25 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.85
United States
Taylor rule 4.9 6.95 5.1 2.75 3.7 4.85 6.15 6.15 5.15
Actual rate 5.0 6.25 3.9 1.7 1.15 1.35 3.2 5.0 5.0
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Figure 8. Difference between the ECB rate and the Taylor rule
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 France and Germany have joined in EMU in 1997 with deficits close to 3% 
(3.3% for France, 2.6% for Germany). From 1998 to 2000, fiscal policies 
have been neutral: both countries have refused to run restrictive policies, 
not wanting to jeopardise the revival of growth. In 2000, public deficits are 
1.5 % of GDP in France, 1.2 in Germany. The two countries were far from 
the limit of 3%, but they have garnered little room for manoeuvre. 
 In 2001-2003, following the global economic slowdown and the German tax 
reform, the two countries implement expansionary policies (1.5 percentage 
points of GDP in France and Germany), in addition to the cyclical deficit, so 
that their deficit reached 4 points of GDP in 2003, inducing the SGP the 
crisis in November 2003. In the Euro area, the fiscal stimulus during those 3 
years was only 1.2 points of GDP, while it was 6 points in the USA or 5.4 
points in the United Kingdom.
 From 2004 to 2007, in a situation of negative output gap, the two countries 
implemented restrictive policies, at a larger extent in Germany (3.1 points) 
than in France (1.6 points), Germany taking advantaged of its renewed 
growth and more favourable monetary conditions. Finally, Germany
succeed to equilibrate its public balance with an effort of 1.4 point of GDP 
from 1997 to 2007 while France undertook no effort globally on the period. 
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Table 15. France and Germany. Output Gap and Fiscal impulse
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
F
OG 1.8 1.0 1.0 -1.5 -1.8 -1.8 -2.7 -2.6 -1.6 -0.8 0.9 0.5 -0.6 -1.5 -1.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3
FI 1.0 0.1 1.2 0.2 -0.9 -0.1 -1.9 -1.0 0.1 -0.2 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.0
G
OG 3.9 1.7 1.5 -1.6 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.4 1.8 1.8 0.2 -1.4 -2.0 -2.4 -0.9 0.4
FI 3.0 0.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.7 1.9 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3
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Figure 9. France: pro-cyclical fiscal stance 1991-2007
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Figure 10. Germany: pro-cyclical fiscal stance 1992-2007
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Figure 11. Index of monetary and budgetary stance
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About policy mix
 In terms of taxation, France is in 2007 at the same level as 1997, while 
Germany has been able to reduce its tax to GDP ratio  by 1.5 points. This 
gap is reflected at the level of primary public spending, which fell by 0.7  
point in France, 3.8 points in Germany. Germany has implemented a 
restrictive expenditure policy that France has never been able to implement 
at the same scale in terms of social benefits (-1.8  point of GDP against 
stability), public wages (-1.6 points of GDP against -0.7 point), public 
consumption (-1 point in the 2 countries), subsidies (-0.7 point against 
stability) and public investment (-0.4 against +0.3).
 Germany has lowered its tax burden in 2001-2002 and used the budget 
deficit as an argument to reduce its expenses. The French government 
seems to want to follow the same strategy, after the decline in taxation in 
2007.
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Two strategies for poor growth performances
Three explanations for so poor growth performances : 
 France and Germany were in average at their level of potential production, 
but this corresponds to a high level of equilibrium unemployment rate, due 
to the bad functioning of their labour market. This vision is hardly compatible 
with the low inflation and the declining share of wages in GDP.
 Demand constraints were the more stringent. It reflects the weakness of 
domestic demand and constraints on economic policies in Europe. The two 
countries have not found any engine for growth: neither the dynamism of 
investment, nor the fall in the savings rate of households. 
 The leading classes of these countries have chosen to maintain a strategy 
of slow growth to control salaries, to restore profits, to improve 
competitiveness. They refuse to take the risk of important expansionary 
policy as in the past and as US does. The consolidation strategy induces 
low growth for some years and then allows for a strong recovery (France: 
1983-86 then 1987-1990, 1991-1996 then 1997-2000; Germany 2001-2005 
then 2006-07). But no tools are used to resist to external shocks. 
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 The period 1997-2007 saw France and Germany implement different 
economic and social policies. Germany and France have been under heavy 
pressure from the EU to reform their economies in a liberal direction. 
Germany did more than France in this way. 
 France has done little to change its labour institutions. Major reforms have 
been the 35 hour working week, the reduction of contributions on low-wage 
and the Prime pour l’emploi, then tax exemption for overtime. They are not 
really liberal reforms. The French Government did not consider such reforms 
before 2008. Germany, with the Hartz reforms, did faster.
 In tax matters, France has chosen to reduce the cost of unskilled work rather 
than use tax competition by reducing the rate of corporate tax and the taxes 
on the wealthiest. France did not reduce its public expenditures. Here too, a 
turning point is taken in 2007. German use tax competition by reducing its 
corporate tax rates.
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Table 16. Product and labour market regulation
Product market 
regulation Employment protection legislation
1998 2003 1990 1998 2003
Austria 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.4 2.2
Belgium 1.9 1.4 3.2 2.5 2.5
France 2.4 1.6 2.7 2.8 2.9
Germany 1.8 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.5
Netherlands 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.3 2.3
Continental(1) 2.0 1.4 2.9 2.6 2.6
Italy 2.7 1.8 3.6 3.1 2.4
Greece 2.7 1.7 3.6 3.5 2.9
Portugal 2.2 1.7 4.1 3.7 3.5
Spain 2.1 1.5 3.8 3.0 3.1
Mediterranean(1) 2.4 1.7 3.7 3.1 2.8
Denmark 1.4 1.1 2.3 1.8 1.8
Finland 2.1 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.1
Sweden 1.8 1.1 3.5 2.6 2.6
Scandinavian(1) 1.8 1.2 2.9 2.3 2.2
Ireland 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.3
UK 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1
Liberal(1) 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.1
US 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.7
(1) Weighted averages 
Source: OECD.
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 Germany has chosen a classical strategy of wage restraints to restore 
company profits and competitiveness while France remained committed to a  
Keynesian active fiscal policy, low exchange rate and low interest rates 
which it is in fact not able to undertake. 
 Germany has experienced a long period of low growth, which is just over. 
Its strategy was painful for the other euro zone MS  in terms of demand and 
competitiveness.
 France has experienced a higher growth, but its external and public deficit 
remains.
 France failed to find allies in Europe for another policy, so it must now 
accept an austerity fiscal policy with the hope to compensate it by a strategy 
aiming to change the labour laws and to increase work incentives. But can 
such a strategy work if growth remains slow?
 The two countries have similar social systems and similar problems but 
different political configurations. They suffers from the absence of fiscal 
harmonisation, from the absence of industrial policy, from the excess of  
financial liberalisation. Can they agree to drive a common economic 
strategy in Europe? This seems unlikely today.
Roundtable
Henri Sterdyniak
Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques
OFCE
69, quai d’Orsay
75007 Paris
sterdyniak@ofce.sciences-po.fr
Berlin, 19-20 June 2008
Franco-German Conference
Germany, France, two answers ?
63
France and Germany were confronted to three issues
 The European economic framework was not satisfying. 
 The non-cooperative strategies are harmful especially for larger economies 
albeit allowing smaller economies to take advantage of it. 
 There is a crisis of continental countries, not prepared to address 
globalisation, having chosen neither a liberal strategy nor a Scandinavian one. 
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Weaknesses in the economic policy framework
 Euro area economic policy framework based on three pillars: a single 
monetary policy, targeting price stability; domestic fiscal policies under the 
surveillance of European procedures, requesting medium-term budgetary 
positions in balance, allowing only economic stabilizers to play and no 
discretionary policy; a strategy of structural reforms assumed to raise 
medium-term growth.
 No common strategy at the area level to support output in the short term. 
Divergences between countries are not taken into account, since there are no 
criteria in terms of domestic inflation or external deficits; public finance targets 
are not set according to national economic situations. 
 No consensus in the EU on the strategy to follow at the macroeconomic level: 
some countries would favour a growth strategy supported by demand, while 
the Commission and some other countries recommend a growth-strategy 
based on supply reforms.
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Weaknesses in the economic policy framework
 No authority in Europe aims at supporting growth, which would be needed to 
allow continental countries to leave mass unemployment. 
 Monetary policy aims at maintaining the inflation rate below 2%; this leads 
interest rates to be increased too early in the cycle, as soon as growth 
rebounds, like we could see in 2006-2007. It let Euro exchange rate 
appreciate, which destroy European competitiveness. 
 Similarly, European authorities request the implementation of restrictive fiscal 
policies as soon as some growth is back. 
 Criteria lacking economic rationale (2% inflation, 3% of GDP limit for deficits, 
objective of budgetary position in balance) have the preference compared to 
growth or employment. 
 This is all the more detrimental that demand tends to be relatively weak in the 
Euro area: households wish to save taking into account uncertainties on the 
future level of pensions, companies hesitate to invest taking into account the 
growth weakness and being tempted to produce in emerging countries, due to 
low costs and rapidly developing markets.
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Non-cooperative national policies
 Fiscal policy is relatively effective in large countries and conversely restrictive 
fiscal policy is particularly costly. Large countries may also use their political 
weight to oppose Commission’s requests reducing their domestic fiscal 
autonomy. Fiscal policy is less powerful in smaller countries. These countries 
also have less political weight.
 Smaller countries can be tempted to improve their competitiveness through 
wage moderation or tax competition, because the resulting negative impact 
on domestic demand will be more than offset by gains from external demand. 
For large countries, such strategies are more painful. Moreover, smaller 
countries have more  often practices of centralized wages negotiations 
between social partners. Thus, they can more easily implement wage 
restriction strategies.
 The result is a non-optimal outcome, with too restrictive fiscal policies and too 
restrictive wages policies, especially in the small countries There is too much 
competition and not enough cooperation in the area. This coordination 
default is harmful for the area as a whole, but the larger countries are in a 
more unfavourable situation than the smaller. 
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Non-cooperative national policies
 The bigger euro area economies initially opposed the non-cooperative 
strategies, but they were victims and obliged to follow like Germany since 
2001, which depresses demand in the euro area and increases the search for 
competitiveness gains or like many countries who decreases their tax rates on 
firms. 
 Large countries (Germany, France, Italy) account for 65% of the euro area 
population (71% with Greece and Portugal). They could thus try to impose a 
more satisfying strategy. However, they have never firmly taken a common 
position. For instance, in the SGP reform debate in 2005, they have not 
imposed that capital expenditures should be deducted from public deficits in 
the assessment of the 3% of GDP threshold. Is this a sacrifice in favour of 
European construction? Or is this a strategic choice of their dominant classes 
and technocratic authorities in order to implement at home unpopular structural 
reforms in the name of Europe? 
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The crisis of the European Social Model
 Tensions are exacerbated by the difficulties for the European Social Model 
in the current phase of globalisation. 
 Continental Europe countries had certain specificities in terms of the role of 
the state in the economy, industrial policies, relationship between firms, 
banks and the State, size of financial markets. They implicitly agreed to give 
up these specificities in the context of financial globalisation and European 
construction, but the coherence of the new regime of growth has not been 
settled. 
 Globalisation puts continental Europe workers more or less directly in 
competition with those of the NMS and Asia. What strategy does Europe 
wish to follow in face of industrial employment losses? 
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The crisis of the European Social Model
 Can Europe choose a two-hands strategy: in one hand subsidizing higher 
education, R&D to make developing an innovative and highly performing 
sector; in the other, subsidizing a less-productive sector of service for the 
persons? Is it possible without a dramatic rise in inequalities, which also 
means reducing the social protection system? Does Europe wish the 
winners of globalisation to compensate for the losses for the losers (but, this 
requires that the winners agree or are constrained to pay, more national 
solidarity or more tax harmonization, two strategies which Europe does 
currently oppose)? 
 Could the Scandinavian strategy, combining efforts on innovation and on re-
qualification and social support of the unemployed, be applied in open, 
heterogeneous and large countries? 
 Without long run coherent strategy, the Continental countries were the 
losers of the European construction, when Scandinavian and liberal 
countries performed better.
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A liberal strategy
 For many economists, like for the Commission, increasing flexibility on all 
markets will increase groth and reduce disparities in Europe. The EU has 
been is unable to organize a satisfactory coordination of economic policies. 
Instead of making suggestions on how to improve the framework, the 
mainstream view in Europe refers to a Walrasian myth: if each economy 
was fully flexible (prices, wages, workers), there would be no need for 
economic policy, so no coordination problem. But the US example shows 
that it is an illusion: even a flexible country needs an economic policy. 
 More flexible labour markets are not the panacea. Contrary to today’s 
mainstream opinion, wage flexibility is not the solution to any demand shock 
as it may increase the lack of demand and the uncertainty (but Keynes 
already said this). 
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A market oriented view
 The market oriented view condemns the European social model to move 
towards the liberal one. It refuses any tax harmonization, which will oblige 
each country to strongly reduce the field of redistribution. If a firm can make 
profits in Germany but pay (reduced) taxes in Switzerland, who will pay for 
the public equipment and infrastructure in Germany? 
 The European dominant classes did not try to protect the Social European 
Model but took the opportunity of globalisation and of the single market to 
impose structural reforms, in particular public and welfare expenditures cuts 
and labour market flexibility. Supporting output by an active macroeconomic 
policy is unproductive: people should understand that they have only the 
choice between accepting a liberal functioning of the economy or seeing 
capitals flows leaving towards more capital-friendly skies.  It is the TINA 
(There Is No Alternative) strategy. 
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More Europe?
 Economic policy could not be decided at the area level. Europe is not a 
nation: there is no unification of the political and social lives. Taxation and 
social protection systems are not unified. Economic situations remain 
different. No consensus on economic policies, institutions, reforms, strategy 
exists among the area; divergence can only be decided by a democratic 
election. But European peoples would probably not agree with a economic, 
political and social unification decided at the European level. It is difficult to 
imagine a single organization able to manage different national situations. 
 Europe governance will need national policies coordination. The euro area 
seems more appropriate for such co-operation than the EU-25 because it 
includes more homogenous economies. But this supposes that countries 
agree to share a common “European social model”, that will need to be 
defined, protected, and be able to evolve.   
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More Europe?
 However, the policy to be followed and the governance remain a delicate 
issue. Economic policy should combine Keynes, Colbert and social 
democracy.
 In a mass-unemployment situation, the euro zone needs a growth-oriented 
policy mix. It would be desirable to set up a real economic policy 
coordination in the framework of the Eurogroup, with whom the ECB would 
have to dialogue. This co-ordination should not focus on public finance 
balances, but should aim at supporting economic activity and achieving a 
3% annual growth target, as in the Lisbon strategy. The process will have to 
take into account countries disparities. The task is not so easy. 
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More Europe?
 Europe must try to design a specific model of European firms, caring about 
employment, growth in the area where they are located and by durable 
growth. Companies have a social role to play. They must take account of 
the interests of their employees and customers, not only of that their 
shareholders. This supposes that Member States maintain relatively high 
company taxation, and subsidize firms locating their activities in lagging 
areas and to help the economic sectors in difficulty, as to provide them 
incentives to innovation and research. States should have an active 
industrial policy, aiming both at developing Large European Companies and 
at supporting the development of innovating SME and Research Centers
networks. European authorities should plan the future of productive 
activities and industrial employment in Europe; reduce the weight of 
competition policy and promote a European industrial policy within the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy. 
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More Europe?
 The objective would be to maintain the European social model, 
characterized by a significant level of transfers, public expenditure and thus 
of taxation. The system will have to be preserved from tax and social 
competition by harmonisation in Europe that will have to include the 
prohibition of unfair competition but also the introduction of minima rates for 
taxation (corporate taxation, tax on wealth and on higher incomes) and for 
benefit (minimum income, minimum pension replacement ratio) and by 
strong measures against tax havens at a worldwide scale. 
 The European Social Model will have to rely on its comparative advantages 
(free education and health for all, public infrastructures, social security 
benefits) to remain competitive in spite of globalisation. With a more 
dynamic growth, the decrease of unemployment rate would allow to extent 
in Continental countries a “flex-security system” inspired by the 
Scandinavian model, which should included a more precise follow-up of the 
unemployed.
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More Europe?
 Improving the European economic framework is not a technical issue; it 
requires a major change in the economic policy thinking, a new alliance 
between social classes concerned about full employment and social 
cohesion, the willingness to depart from the financial markets and 
globalised firms point of view. This move would be easier to undertake at 
the European than at a National level, but it would require an agreement 
between people of each EMU Member State, which would be difficult to 
reach.
